Introduction
Economic exchanges rely to a great extent on information provided to and obtained by investors from different sources and channels. Economic theories of financial markets have long recognized the central role of information in animating markets (e.g., Arrow 1963 Arrow , 1984 . Information is at the heart of any contractual relationship. It allows investors to make "informed" investment decisions and to verify whether other contracting parties fulfill their obligations. As such, information is crucial for the realization of any accountability relationship.
Financial decisions, however, also rely on the trust that individual investors have in the functioning of markets. The role of trust in everyday (economic) life is easily overlooked, due to its fundamental and implicit nature (Giddens 1990) . Trust is needed because it would be impossible or at least overly costly to obtain a sufficient level of information that would allow us to say that we "have checked it all by ourselves". Trust in financial markets refers to the expectations that investors have regarding the behavior of other market participants. As Olsen (2008) puts it, "investors' trust in the expertise and intentions of corporate managers, financial advisors and regulators is the 'will of the wisp' that creates and animates what we call the financial marketplace" (p. 2189).
Whilst economic exchanges are usually based on both information and trust, there is a tendency to see trust as the more problematic ingredient in such exchanges. This is because trust implies a status of being "vulnerable to the actions of another party" (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995, p. 712) . Moreover, there may be insufficient monitoring or control mechanisms to prevent damages in the event that the other party fails to perform as expected.
This apparent limitation on trust helps to explain increasing calls for greater information and transparency in financial markets. Particularly in the aftermath of corporate scandals, market crashes, and financial crises, calls for greater transparency are widely heard (see, e.g., Kaufmann and Weber 2010) . 1 It is argued that greater transparency would allow market participants to make more "informed" decisions leading to a reduction in damages arising from unexpected events -ranging from simple under-performance to fraudulent activities.
1 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was enacted in response to numerous corporate and accounting scandals. It aims to reinforce corporate accountability (Jain and Rezaee 2006) .
There are, however, certain critical voices that question whether more transparency can actually lead to an improved marketplace. In early 2009, The Economist featured an article arguing that the case for more information was not as clear-cut as it may seem:
"In financial markets, [transparency] is nearly always equated with information disclosure. The trouble is that the information is often incomplete, irrelevant or outright incomprehensible. Subprime-mortgagebacked securities are a case in point. These instruments-whose value remains shrouded in mystery-can have prospectuses of about 500-600 pages, most of which are devoted to intricate legalese. Yet, inexplicably, they do not contain the information about individual loans that is needed to detect default risk" (Anonymous 2009 ).
This sort of skepticism is also reflected in academic research. Roberts (2009) has suggested that increased information may simply create an "illusion of transparency" (p. 962) rather than actually improving control and accountability. While the belief in the production of additional information suggests that "all that accountability requires is this laying bare or making visible of 'what is'" (p. 962), the problem with such a view, argues Roberts, is that information may easily become decoupled from the real concerns of practice and turn into a form of impression management or the production of comfort (see also Power 1997) . Roberts (2009) associates the illusion of transparency with the rather abstract nature of the information upon which transparency often relies. He contrasts this with an "intelligent" form of accountability which does not rely on distant information but seeks to engage with the details of practice, typically in the form of a "face-to-face encounter, rich with information, in which communication is less easily stage-managed and rhetoric can be constantly compared to actual practice" (p. 966). The idea of an "intelligent accountability" is to seek information that can be trusted allowing a genuine accountability relationship to emerge (see also O'Neill 2002) .
In this paper, we build upon this line of thinking and extend it by discussing the possibilities and limits of an "intelligent accountability" in the context of financial investment decisions. We investigate empirically how different forms of information and trust influence an investor's original investment decision as well as his or her subsequent behavior. While we show that information may create an "illusion of transparency" (Roberts 2009 ), our empirical material also suggests that "intelligent accountability", as envisaged by Roberts (2009) and O'Neill (2002) , may be difficult to realize in financial markets. Intelligent accountability would require assessing asset management practices in a direct way, possibly through face-toface interactions between investors and the fund manager. Such contacts are rare in the context of investment decision making because most investors invest "at distance". Even if there is close contact between the contracting parties, there may be mechanisms that prevent intelligent accountability to be realized.
We derive our findings from an analysis of the investment fraud of Bernard Madoff, which was revealed at the end of 2008. Madoff had for many decades run a wealth management business, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (BMIS), without investing his clients' money in securities. He created a so-called Ponzi scheme 2 , where money from new investors is used to pay interest and dividends to existing ones. We chose to work with the Madoff case primarily because of the considerable amount of attention that it has attracted in the media. The public material available about the case has allowed us to contextualize, and extend, our primary empirical material collected through interviews with individual U.S. investors. The exceptional nature of the Madoff fraud may imply that we are dealing with a case that is unique in terms of the dynamics of information, trust, and accountability in which we are interested. However, we believe that, despite its exceptional aspects, the Madoff fraud helps us to understand some generic mechanisms at work in investment decision making.
Our paper makes several contributions to existing literature. First, we contribute to the literature on accountability (see, e.g., O'Neill 2002; Messner 2009; Roberts 2009 ) by discussing the possibilities and limits of realizing an "intelligent" form of accountability in financial markets. In particular, we argue that the implementation of "intelligent accountability" requires conditions that are rarely met in the context of financial investments and that, instead of trying to improve accountability, it may be more fruitful to caution investors regarding some basic rules. Second, we illustrate the usefulness of Zucker's (1986) distinction between characteristics-based, process-based, and institutional-based trust for research in accounting. Prior accounting literature (e.g., Das and Teng 2001; Langfield-Smith and Smith 2003; Emsley and Kidon 2007) has relied on other typologies of trust to explain phenomena (for an exception, see Neu 1991) . We believe that Zucker's typology is useful for accounting research because it pays particular attention to institutional-based trust, which has increased in importance in the last decades (Unerman and O'Dwyer 2004) . Finally, our paper contributes to the fraud literature (Healy and Palepu 2003; Unerman and O'Dwyer 2004; Cooper 2008; Cohen, Ding, Lesage, and Stolowy 2010) by offering unique data regarding one of the most spectacular cases of fraud.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following manner. In the next section, we elaborate on the concepts of information and trust and examine the relationship between them.
The third section describes our research design. After providing some background information on the empirical context of our study, in the fourth section, we analyze the interplay of information and trust in the Madoff case. We conclude with a discussion of the concept of intelligent accountability and provide suggestions for future research.
Information and trust
When individuals engage in a contractual relationship -such as by forming an organization or exchanging goods or services -the contracting parties have certain expectations regarding the other person's behavior. For example, in an exchange of goods, there are expectations regarding the quantity and quality of the goods, the venue and time of the exchange, and so forth. There is a certain degree of risk that these expectations may not be fulfilled.
Contracting parties will therefore try to obtain information to help them decide whether they should engage in the relationship in the first place and whether to continue the relationship over time.
The accounting literature is well aware of the crucial role of information for decisionmaking. One stream of literature investigates, for example, how experimental subjects react in terms of investment decisions or other types of decisions when confronted with additional information (Maines and McDaniel 2000; Libby, Bloomfield, and Nelson 2002; Koonce, McAnally, and Mercer 2005; Libby, Hun-Tong, and Hunton 2006; Maines, Salamon, and Sprinkle 2006) . Another stream of research develops analytical models focusing on the optimal type of information needed under the assumption that the behavior of the agent is not directly observable (Verrecchia 1990a (Verrecchia , 1990b Gigler 1994) More recently, there has also been empirical work on the value of information exchanged in face-to-face relationships in financial markets (Barker 1998; Roberts, Sanderson, Barker, and Hendry 2006) .
Decisions are rarely made in the context of complete information and certainty. In everyday life, many things are simply taken for granted. Information is actively sought, but it can only reduce part of the uncertainty in the environment. The remaining gap between information and uncertainty is often filled through trust. As Tomkins (2001) says, "trust implies adopting a belief without full information" (p. 165). For example, when making financial investments, investors may choose not to obtain additional information about the companies in which their investment advisor places their money, because they trust that the advisor will make the right decisions. While trust is thus "an alternative uncertainty absorption mechanism to increased information" (Tomkins 2001, p. 165-166) , trust also relies on information. There must be some reason for trust to develop, and this reason is linked to information about past experience. Zucker (1986) suggests that trust may be based on three types of information: information about a person and his or her characteristics, such as family background or ethnicity; information about past exchanges with that person such as reputation; or information about certain institutions and their functioning (reliance on the power of institutions). Accordingly, she distinguishes between characteristic-based trust,
process-based trust, and institutional-based trust.
3
Some scholars have pointed out that through time, institutional-based trust has increased in importance (Zucker 1986; Giddens 1990; Beck 1992) . With increased globalization and time-space distanciation (Giddens 1990) , trust has shifted from trust in specific people and their activities into a more diffuse trust in institutions or "expert systems" (ibid.). For example, in the specific context of stock exchanges, Neu (1991) examined the mechanisms involved in new share issuances and concluded that "institutional-based" trust has become increasingly important for the effective functioning of new share issuances as compared with "process-based" and "characteristic-based" trust.
The accounting literature has looked at the role of trust in organizational decision-making, and particularly in the context of inter-organizational relationships (van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman 2000; Free 2007; Vélez et al. 2008) . However, little focus has been placed on institutional-based trust. The accounting literature has also looked at the crucial role of trust in financial markets (Unerman and O'Dwyer 2004) , but a detailed empirical examination of the impact of trust and its interplay with information in financial decision-making is missing.
Research design
The research design employed in this study involves a qualitative approach based upon interviews with individuals who invested with Madoff and analysis of letters written by other 3 There are other definitions and categorizations of trust that have been applied in the accounting and organization literatures (Moorman, Deshpandé, and Zaltman 1993; Mayer et al. 1995, p. 712; Nooteboom 1996; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer 1998; Das and Teng 2001; Neves and Caetano 2006, p. 353; Emsley and Kidon 2007, p. 830; Patzelt and Shepherd 2008; Vélez, Sánchez, and Álvarez-Dardet 2008; Vosselman and Meer-Kooistra 2009, p. 269 request to speak at the sentencing) and 48 "indirect" investors who ask for the right to be considered in the same way as direct investors.
We decided to examine these 113 statements for several reasons. First, we thought that the investors who narrated personal stories in written form would be the ones most willing to be interviewed. Second, reading the letters provided us with some background information regarding the investors, such as whether they had invested directly or indirectly in the Madoff funds. This information proved helpful in preparing our interviews.
Among the 113 statements, 45 included an e-mail address while 12 included only a postal address or telephone number. Accordingly, we sent out 45 e-mails and 12 letters asking for an interview: 55 contacts were made with direct investors (out of 65) and two e-mails were sent to indirect investors: one who represented 46 other indirect investors in a "Ponzi victims coalition" and one who contacted the Judge directly. Eleven investors (10 following e-mails and one after having received a letter) accepted an invitation to have a conversation with us.
Each interview was made by telephone or voice over internet following the interview guide shown in Appendix 1. The interviews were recorded with the approval of the interviewees and were subsequently transcribed. Given the stressful situation for most of our interviewees, we kept the conversations rather short. Among the eleven investors, nine were direct investors in Madoff's funds and two (Investors 6 and 7) invested indirectly through a feeder fund.
In addition to the interviews, we analyzed in detail the statements written by the 65 direct investors and found, in 26 instances, some textual material related to our research topic and corresponding to our interview guide. Among these 26 statements, eight were written by investors that we interviewed. Consequently, to avoid double counting, we removed these statements from our data set. Our resulting sample includes 29 investors: 11 interviews and 18 statements from non-interviewed investors.
We complemented the interviews and analyzed statements with several other sources of data that allowed us to obtain a better understanding of the fraud and of the relationship between Madoff's company and the investors. First, we conducted two further interviews: one with the CFO of an organization that is close to the Jewish community, and which was mentioned in the media because it chose not to invest with Madoff (Strober and Strober 2009, p. 42) 6 and one with the CEO of a company specializing in defending the interests of minority shareholders, who represents several of Madoff's investors. In addition to our interviews, we also consulted publicly available primary materials, such as videos of victims published on the Internet. 7 Finally, we read several books (Arvedlund 2009; Kirtzman 2009; LeBor 2009; Oppenheimer 2009; Ross 2009; Sander 2009; Strober and Strober 2009; Weinstein 2009; Henriques 2011) and press articles (see, e.g., Seal 2009) that addressed the Madoff fraud or books dealing with the Ponzi scheme (Dunn 1975; Walsh 1998; Zuckoff 2006) .
Two main questions guided our interviews: What led people to invest with Madoff and how did this impact their behavior prior to the investment decision? What kind of information did investors receive during the investment period and how did this influence their behavior along the way?
Data analysis was carried out by reading through the interview transcripts and the impact statements and by moving back and forth between data and theory until we were able to identify patterns that we thought provided interesting theoretical insights (Ahrens and Chapman 2006) . In the following sections, we present these insights, organized around the themes of information and trust. 8 Before doing so, we provide some summary background about the Madoff fraud.
The investment fraud of Bernard Madoff
Bernard Madoff's investment clients (Ross 2009, p. 73) .
Madoff confessed that he had begun his fraudulent financial scheme in the early 1990s.
However, federal investigators believe that the fraud began as early as the 1980s (Ross 2009, p. 205; Safer 2009 ). While the amounts missing from client accounts is alleged to be as much as $65 billion, the court appointed trustee has estimated the losses to investors were actually about $18 billion (Henriques 2009 (Frank, Efrati, Lucchetti, and Bray 2009 ).
The collapse of Madoff's investment company and the subsequent freezing of his assets and those of his firm affected businesses, charities, and foundations around the world. In table 1, we present a summarized chronology of the main events of the Madoff case.
Insert Table 1 About Here
Deciding to invest: information and trust
When asked about how they got into contact with Madoff's investment fund, several of our interviewees referred to other persons, such as relatives, friends, or business partners, who recommended investing in Madoff securities:
"I had a partner on the account, and my partner's brothers worked for a firm on Long Island, in New York, who had their retirement plans with Madoff.
And we heard about it through that connection. [My partner's] brother worked for that company and was telling us how pleased he was with his profit-sharing plan with the company" (Investor 2, interview).
"My mother was a direct investor.
[…] I originally went in on that account to help her, because I am a professional.
[…] Friends recommended that she go to this" (Investor 9, interview). My father saw that Paul was doing well and decided to invest some money with him" (Investor 21, impact statement).
"I was looking for a new financial advisor, because the one I had had for a few years was retiring, and I spoke to a businessman, a friend of mine in New York, who told me that he had two advisors that he used. One was […] and another one was Bernard Madoff, whom I had never heard of. I had a lot of confidence in my friend" (Investor 4, interview).
As implied in the last quote from investor 4, acting upon recommendations from others requires a certain level of confidence or trust that the advice is sound and that the investment will be profitable. Zucker's (1986) distinction between characteristic-based, process-based, and institutional-based trust provides a useful distinction and categorization to understand the kinds of trust dynamics that were at work in the Madoff case.
In the case of characteristic-based trust, what counts are a person's characteristics, such as family background or ethnicity. If another person shares some of these characteristics, then this creates a common background which reduces the perceived need to negotiate the terms of exchange, or to inquire into the other person's credibility (Zucker 1986, p. 61 (Ross 2009, p. 162, 176) ; the "French connection" through Access International and Thierry de la Villehuchet 9 ; and the "Latin connection" via Banco Santander (Sander 2009, p. 83 ). Fairfax (2001, p. 70) refers to the exploitation of such shared characteristics as "affinity fraud".
Affinity frauds prey on groups -religious, ethnic, professional, or other like-minded organizations -in order to sell some kind of investment or membership in something (Sander 2009, p. 73) . Among our interviewees and the analyzed statements, only one referred to affinity with Madoff:
"My Dad did not want to even discuss it. He was so committed to Madoff.
And a lot of this had to do, again, the relationship... And he had only met
Bernie and/or Peter one time. But the tie to the Jewish community, Jewish philanthropy, Jewish charities and the fact that his friends were also successfully working with Madoff; there was no other place for us to put the money" (Investor 8, interview).
However, even if there was no direct affinity between an investor and Madoff, characteristics-based trust may have been at work. Potential investors' trust in their relatives or friends, with whom they share certain expectations, can create characteristics-based trust "second-hand". This seems to have been the case for investor 4 who explains that he "had a lot of confidence in [his] friend".
Personal characteristics do not seem to have been the most important trust-producing mechanisms for our interviewees. A second form of trust was more visible in our interviews.
Zucker refers to this as process-based trust which she defines as trust "tied to past or expected exchange such as in reputation or gift-exchange" (Zucker 1986, p. 53-54) . What counts here is the fact that there is some past track record that fuels one's expectations about the future.
The following quotes exemplify this kind of trust:
"As a matter of fact, I went to the New York Public Library and I In the first quote, trust is generated through knowledge about the past success of Madoff;
in the second through fifth quotes, it is Madoff's participation in prestigious institutions or reputation that creates expectations concerning his investment expertise. As pointed out by Zucker (1986) , a record of prior exchanges is often "obtained second-hand" (p. 60). When the investors refer to how their friends or relatives made money with Madoff, they build upon second-hand experiences. When investor 2, in the quotation above, explains "how pleased" his partner's brother was with his investment with Madoff, or when investor 25 mentions that
Madoff was "doing well for his clients", they allude to this type of trust-producing mechanism, where past performance is taken as a predictor for future performance. Processbased trust may come about in an even more indirect way. When some of our interviewees referred to the financial expertise of their relatives and friends, they formed their expectations on the basis of prior exchanges rather than those with Madoff: Someone who was "very successful with finances" can be expected to make the right investment decisions in the future. Such process-based trust is hardly sufficient in and of itself to motivate an investment. The investment must also appear to be attractive to the potential investor. Someone who is very trustworthy may recommend an investment with a safe return of, say, 3% per annum, but this will not motivate an investor who looks for higher returns. In the case of Madoff, it appears that many investors were attracted by the stability of returns that Madoff's investments had provided in the past rather than looking for a very high rate of return. As one of our interviewees elaborates: Being "one of America's wealthiest individuals" implies that this friend would be able to identify a good investment. Thus, there is process-based trust at work here. At the same time, the investor was apparently attracted by what he perceived to be "relatively safe and consistent returns". Another investor responds in a similar vein:
"Now, my Dad and his brother were very, very, very conservative investors.
[…] Somewhere along the line, probably at one of the country clubs, during a golf game, or whatever, one of the friends said: 'I met this guy Bernie Madoff, and he has a fund that has virtually guaranteed returns, and he has already got a track record'" (Investor 8, interview).
It was not extraordinarily high returns that the "conservative investors" were looking for;
rather it was the idea of "virtually guaranteed returns" that were higher than those of other, low-risk investments.
The presence of characteristics-based and process-based trust reduces the perceived need to obtain additional information regarding the investment, which highlights the substitution effect of trust. "He [a friend of the investor] told me that he had talked to the people at the SEC and they told him that everything they knew about Mr. Madoff was satisfactory" (Investor 4, interview).
"Madoff was given a green light by the SEC" (Investor 11, interview).
"Hearing from the SEC that he was a safe broker we thought we were OK with leaving our money with him" (Investor 12, impact statement).
" [Madoff] was repeatedly investigated and given a clean bill of health by a government watchdog agency named the SEC" (Investor 14, impact statement).
In all six of these quotes, reference was made to the SEC and its role in monitoring the activities of Madoff's firm. It is apparent from the quotes that the investors were reassured by Madoff's claim that he had been investigated by the SEC and that he had received "a clean bill of health". However there was an investigation, it took about ten minutes, and they found no issues, and that was the end of it" (Investor 8, interview).
"I was aware that Madoff was investigated by the SEC on several occasions, and subsequently, no indiscretions were found. I felt secure by the SEC's findings and that my investments were SAFE" (Investor 17, impact statement).
"I continued to feel very secure despite a few blips on the radar, which were immediately cleared up by a statement made by the SEC confirming that Mr. The above discussion suggests that different forms of trust impacted the investors' decision to put their money into Madoff's fund.
Information and the "illusion of transparency"
In light of the above discussion, one may wonder whether increased information can lead to a breakdown of trust rather than a strengthening of it. This would be the case if the information obtained raised doubt about the quality or seriousness of the investment. In particular, information that is obtained "first-hand" by the investors themselves may have such an effect.
From our interviews, we learned about two types of such first-hand information: face-to-face encounters with Madoff and information received through the regularly sent account statements. We now turn to discuss how these two types of information impacted investors' beliefs about their investments.
Encountering Madoff
Prior literature suggests that face-to-face contact offers the possibility for a more intimate social relationship in which the contracting party can be subject to increased scrutiny (Roberts 1991; Shearer 2002; Roberts et al. 2006) . In face-to-face encounters, the exchange of information takes on a more "socializing" form that allows for both stronger elaboration of one's own positions and a better understanding of the other person's perspectives (Roberts 1991) . It would thus seem that information obtained first-hand through such meetings will have a particularly important impact on investors' decisions.
Most investors did not meet Madoff in person, but some of them did. It is instructive to examine their accounts in terms of how such encounters developed. Among our interviewees, one investor narrated his encounter with Madoff. We quote his narrative at some length here, because of its illuminating nature:
I met with Madoff... I met with one of his salespeople, or advisors, I do not remember the exact word, and I had a meeting with him, and he said to me:
"Come on, let us go meet Bernie now." So, he took me into Mr. Madoff's office, and he was sitting behind a big desk, very imposing, and the first thing he said to me was: "You know, we need a minimum of a million dollars for you to get into the fund." And at the time, I had the money, I said:
"I am prepared to do that." And then, he started asking me a lot of questions. This quote reflects the different strategies that Madoff used to deflect investors' efforts towards obtaining more information. The encounter starts when the potential investor suggests that it should be investor who asks the questions, rather than Madoff. The first strategy employed by Madoff was to point to the regulatory role played by the SEC. In so doing, he invokes the power of institutional-based trust, emphasizing again the substitution effect of trust. The beginning of the quote also reveals a complementary mechanism at work.
When Madoff starts the conversation by pointing out that one million dollars is required to fellow, and bla-bla-bla, and we will put you in the fund. We will get you in."
Like they were doing me a favor. I found out later, that was their modus operandi with many people. They declined them, and then, they did them a favor by taking them back in, and I think they have done that many times"
(Investor 1, interview).
The implication that the investor would be allowed into an exclusive club is increased by
Madoff first rejecting the request to invest. Only later is Madoff doing the investor a "favor"
by eventually allowing him to put money into the fund.
"The whole deal with Bernie Madoff was, you felt you are lucky to be in a club, so to speak, to be invested with him. My friends [said], well, can't you get me in, can't you get me in?" (Investor 10, interview).
The following quote illustrates one strategy of Madoff for not answering questions.
"Bernie had several stipulations. He would invest Hadassah's money but would be unavailable to answer questions from anyone on our financial advisory board. When I asked him why, he told me the investment advisory side of his company was very small and he implied that he was doing this as an accommodation and didn't want to be bothered by people asking him a lot of questions" (Weinstein 2009, p. 40 ).
In addition, Madoff's efforts to limit the information provided to investors was explained on the basis that he had developed an investment strategy that he needed to keep secret in order to continue offering the extra returns that investors were looking for. While none of our interviewees commented on this point, quotes from the secondary literature point in this direction:
"The fact that he refused to reveal the secrets of his operation only encourage these investors to believe that of all the extant investment advisers, he and he alone possessed the right stuff" [quotation from an interview] (Strober and Strober 2009, p. 152) .
"I asked Madoff how he was able to accomplish his amazing returns. 'I can't go into it in great detail. It's a proprietary strategy'" (Arvedlund 2009, p. 7) .
By insisting on the proprietary nature of his investment strategy, Madoff managed to become "unaccountable" to his investors regarding the details of his strategy. This is not surprising given that Madoff was regarded as an "expert" or even "genius" who managed to outperform the market precisely because he acted in a different way. In his discussion of the "limits of accountability", Messner (2009) observes that successful managers or entrepreneurs are often praised for breaking the rules and acting contrary to conventional wisdom. 10 If such a practice is accepted -which is often the case as long as it proves to be successful, -then it is difficult to apply the same accountability standards to the details of such actions as in other 10 As Cohen et al. (2010) note, it appears that several managers of fraudulent firms received praise and admiration from the press. cases. The designation as an expert or a genius implies that some level of unaccountability must be accepted, because it is understood that experts or geniuses cannot simply "explain" what they do -otherwise, everyone could imitate them. We observed four mechanisms at work in investors' personal encounters with Madoff -a reference to institutions that provided assurance; the exclusivity granted to investors;
Madoff's status as an expert; and Madoff's personality. These mechanisms complemented each other in ensuring investors' trust that, despite a low level of information, Madoff was acting in their best interest.
Receiving statements
While the above empirical evidence suggests that Madoff skillfully avoided providing detailed explanations about his trading strategies, this does not mean that investors were given no information at all. In fact, providing no information would probably have created skepticism among investors as to where their money really was going. Madoff's strategy was to provide investors with a form of written information that would give them little reason to question the credibility of his operations. 11 From our interviewees, we learn that they received regular statements concerning their investments:
12 "I received a very, very detailed monthly statement, every month without fail. The statement showed purchases of stock. The purchase showed selling of stock. The statement showed purchases of United States Treasury Bills.
And some of them even had numbers. So, you know, you thought you were really getting the right thing. And every month I looked at my statement, and I said: "Oh, look how much money I made this month." You know? And the 11 It has long been recognized that financial reporting influences the decisions of external parties interested in gauging organizational performance (Covaleski, Dirsmith, and White 1987) . 12 Two investors agreed to send us a copy of their statements: one is dated from 1997 and the other from 2008. Both are identical in terms of format. We provide in Appendix 2 an excerpt from one statement. Private information concerning the investor has been removed. A second point worth mentioning is that the statements contained names and stock prices of well-known companies, companies that the investors were familiar with. This reference to real companies reinforced the perceived legitimacy of the statements:
"Monthly statements indicated that all of the investments were in the Fortune 500 companies; all very, very, very big names" (Investor 8, interview).
Third, the statements had the appearance of security, as illustrated by the following quote:
"We all knew that there is risk associated with the stock market but our statements showed [that] we were diversified" (Investor 21, impact statement).
Fourth, the statements sent by BMIS appeared to be real because they could be exchanged with other parties, most notably tax authorities, who would provide another external validation regarding the truthfulness of the statements: The forms were completely consistent and did not look odd or strange at all" (Investor 5, interview).
"At the end of the year, [you got] all the proper tax information that you needed to file your taxes, because this was a direct investment" (Investor 9, interview).
The production of statements similar to regular bank statements, exchangeable with third parties, and linked to other institutions (such shares in well-known companies) helped to create an impression of normality. Whether the statements were "real" in the sense of representing actual trades was difficult for an investor to see. Some of the investors tried to conduct "reality checks" by looking at whether the stock prices indicated on the statements corresponded to those in the newspapers or whether the total sums were calculated correctly:
"My husband […] periodically -especially, when he started to put more money in - […] checked that the stocks on the days that we supposedly purchased them, were purchased at that price; that the dividends came through on the dates stated.
[Madoff] had a very elaborate scam" (Investor 9, interview). "I used to work in the computer business and I understand bookkeeping; everything was totaled to the penny" [quotation] (Strober and Strober 2009, p. 109) .
Some other investors performed some due diligence:
"The monthly statements we received were reviewed and logged in our own version of due diligence" (Investor 28, impact statement).
While these reality tests might have created comfort, they did not allow the investors to judge whether the statements were "true" in the sense of corresponding to an underlying reality of actual trades. Madoff was making sure that there was an ex post correspondence between the information on the statements and publicly available information:
"Madoff or his lieutenants were checking the stock returns from previous days and weeks and instructing the clerks to enter transactions that were based on old results. The computer system would apply the same formula to each client's account, the only difference being the number of shares each of them owned" (Kirtzman 2009, p. 137) .
All that investors could check was whether the statements were similar in form to statements issued by other institutions and whether the information regarding stock prices was correct. What they could not do was to "see through" the statements and compare them with some real-world actions to which the statements should correspond. Even when supposedly "actual operations" of BMIS were observed, it was impossible to distinguish between appearance and fact:
"He [Madoff] impressed me very much, as he did everyone else, and there were banks of computers and people running all over the place. I thought this had to be legitimate" [quotation] (Strober and Strober 2009, p. 131) .
In light of this, one could argue that the "reality checks" carried out by the investors were simply not elaborate enough. When trying to see whether statements were telling the truth or not, investors only scratched the surface rather than inquiring in depth into what was or was not underneath the statements. Taking such a view, however, implies assuming that it is feasible to distinguish between true and false representations of reality. The problem with this is that representations, in general, are usually regarded as real not because they are successfully compared with some underlying real event or action; instead, whether they are taken for real or not depends on how they compare to other representations that one has access to. For example, when a newspaper writes about an event that apparently has happened, most people can compare this representation only to what other media say about the event, since in the majority of cases, people will not have directly experienced the event in question. When different representations refer to each other, they create a web of crossreferences which can gain credibility independently from any underlying reality. Baudrillard (1981, 1994) refers to the extreme extension of this idea as a state of "hyperreality": a world in which it is no longer possible to distinguish between true and false representations, because there is nothing but the representations and no underlying reality to which these representations can be compared (see also Poster 1988) 14 . Several accounting scholars have taken up this idea and have suggested that accounting representations can only be judged as true or false relative to other accounting representations, rather than in relation to some underlying reality (McGoun 1997; Macintosh, Shearer, Thornton, and Welker 2000; Graham 2008 ). Macintosh et al. (2000) , for example, refer to share market prices as representations of the intrinsic value of a firm, and suggest that the idea that "investors can 'see through'
accounting numbers to discern true market value is no longer sustainable" (p. 31).
In the case of Madoff, the representation was, objectively, wrong. The only thing the investors could do was to compare the representations they received with other representations. This did not help them to detect the fraud, because the representations seemed to correspond with each other. The statements received from Madoff appeared to be normal, because they were similar to the other types of information they were regularly confronted with. 
Discussion

Information and trust
Our inquiry into the investment fraud of Bernard Madoff allows us to explore the interplay between information and trust in financial decision making. In our empirical analysis, we distinguish between an investor's initial decision to invest with Madoff and their decision to maintain the investment or even to re-invest money later on. Figure 1 is organized around 14 Eco (1990) refers to the same concept using the expression "authentic fake".
these two decisions and summarizes our empirical observations regarding the different types of information and forms of trust that impact on investors' behavior. Zucker's (1986) The argument for a face-to-face accountability seems particularly appropriate for those professions which have traditionally relied on face-to-face contact and whose work has only recently become colonialized by more abstract forms of performance measurement and control (Power, Laughlin, and Cooper 2003) . This is particularly true for the public sector (O'Neill 2002; Miliband 2004; Kamuf 2007; Paquet 2007 Chevalier and Ellisson (1999) examine the labor market for mutual fund managers. They find that "termination" is performance-sensitive, especially for younger managers. This is consistent with investors being focused on performance and results.
Insert Figure 1 about here
The dominant focus on results allows investment managers to direct attention away from the details of their investment processes and strategies. This is indeed what we observed in the case of Madoff as well: Madoff refused to answer questions about his business practices or his investment strategies. He never provided explanations or monthly performance assessments, even informally, and even went so far as to threaten to expel some investors who asked too many questions. Access to Madoff's offices for on-site due diligence was very limited or even denied (Gregoriou and Lhabitant 2009) . To some extent, such an attitude is consistent with the notion of proprietary costs (Verrecchia 1990a) : if an investment manager were to disclose his strategies in detail, his ability to generate an abnormal return would disappear because the strategy would be imitated by others. Madoff cleverly mobilized this argument, thereby justifying the low level of "intelligent" accountability provided to the investors.
Madoff furthermore created a "transfer of accountability" by referring to the role of the SEC. This transfer was to a large extent artificial since Madoff was not registered as an investment advisor with the SEC until September 2006. Until then, he avoided registration by using a regulatory loophole: registration was not mandatory for investment advisors with fewer than fifteen clients. Madoff maintained that he had fewer than fifteen feeders (he was allowed to count each feeder as one client, regardless of the number of final investors). He could therefore operate without being exposed to the random audits of the SEC.
Consequently, one insight from our study pertains to the difficulty of achieving an "intelligent accountability" for individual investors as called for by Roberts (2009) .
"Intelligent accountability" is arguably more realizable for institutional investors. Institutional investors have a more intimate relationship with fund managers and are more capable than individual investors to challenge fund manager's actions (see Roberts et al. 2006) . Such role for institutional investors was advocated as early as 1992 by legal scholars (see Black 1992 for instance). To some extent, the U.S. law has also conferred such a monitoring function on institutional investors, in that the U.S. congress has exempted funds from registration if the issuer privately offers its securities to purchasers who are "sophisticated investors" (Section 4(2) of the Securities Act). The investors to whom private offerings may be made are considered to be sophisticated investors because they have the resources and financial expertise to obtain access to, and evaluate, information concerning the offering that they deem significant for their respective investment decisions and investment objectives. Thus, they are considered to "have the wherewithal to 'fend for themselves' " (Smith 2010, p. 218 (Baik, Kang, and Kim 2010) , in our case this advantage, if it existed, was apparently not sufficient to detect the fraudulent behavior of Bernard Madoff. Thus, the illusion of transparency, extended even to "sophisticated" investors.
Remedies
Some suggestions can be advanced to potentially alleviate the dangers that accompany the illusion of transparency in financial decision making. The first suggestion would be to extend the scope of the controls performed by institutions like the SEC, which would then lead to an enhancement of institutional-based trust. Since 1933, U.S. federal law has regulated the offering of securities to the public. The purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 is to "provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce
[…] and to prevent frauds in the sale" of securities. This is accomplished primarily by requiring registration of offerings of securities to the public with the SEC. The Securities Act provides an exemption from the registration requirements for issuers who offer securities to sophisticated investors because these investors have the resources and financial expertise to obtain access to, and evaluate, information about the security they deem significant for their investment strategy (section 4.2 of the Securities Act). In other words, the federal statute recognizes that sophisticated investors may not need the controls provided by the SEC. Such a view is questionable given the Madoff fraud (Smith 2010) , and as a result there have been calls for an extension of the scope of the SEC investigations.
A second suggestion would be to sensitize investors to the impact that characteristicbased and process-based trust may have on their decisions. Connections based on characteristics facilitate information transfers, but they can also be channels for favoritism or a substitute for an "intelligent accountability". Therefore, characteristics-based trust should not ordinarily form the basis for investing by individual investors, even though this appears to be a logical way to proceed in normal every day decision making processes. Similarly, past returns, which form the basis for process-based trust in investment decisions, are not necessarily predictive of future performance in any type of investment. Instead, they may be used strategically by investment managers to comfort investors and create an illusion of security. Furthermore, in an era of hyper-reality, the representations contained in account statements may not accurately portray an underlying economic reality, or, more importantly, there may be no reality underlying the representations. As a result, the individual investor must also be skeptical of process-based trust.
Despite all efforts in this direction, it will still remain difficult to entirely overcome the problems associated with misplaced trust and deceiving forms of transparency. We therefore argue that, in addition to the above-mentioned remedies, one way forward for investors to avoid falling prey to fraudulent behavior is to apply some rather basic rules when making investment decisions. One possibility would be to explicitly foreclose particular forms of exchange in which trust might, over time, come to influence one's decisions. Our interview with the CFO of an organization that decided not to invest with Madoff provides an example of such a mechanism. The CFO explained that his organization never considered investing with Madoff because they "had a firm policy against investing in funds that were managed by members [of their investment committee]" and because they required an independent custodian for any management account investment (Non-investor 1). Rules of this nature prevent against entering into certain types of investments even when there are "good" reasons to do so, such as high past performance, reputation, or an exclusive right to invest.
Another possibility would be to more strongly diversify one's investments (see Makower and Marschak 1938; Markowitz 1952; Samuelson 1967) . Diversification allows investors to reduce risk by holding a variety of different types of assets in their portfolio. The diversification principle can also be applied to the intermediaries used by investors. Even if investors cannot entirely rule out cases of fraud, diversification among different intermediaries at least allows them to reduce the relative impact of such events on their wealth.
Conclusion
In this paper, we use the investment fraud of Bernard Madoff to inquire into the possibilities and limits of an "intelligent accountability" (Roberts 2009 ) in the context of financial decision making. Drawing mainly on interviews with individual investors and their letters, we demonstrate that institutional-based, characteristics-based and process-based trust supported investors' decisions to put their money into the Madoff fund. In addition, we find that the written account statements regularly sent by Madoff provided an illusion of transparency.
Rather than creating skepticism with respect to Madoff's transactions, these statements comforted investors by showing that the investments performed well. This supports the idea that greater transparency does not necessarily lead to more accountability. Moreover, our
paper raises doubts about the possibility of remedying this situation through more "intelligent" accountability in the form of face-to-face contacts between investors and investees. Not only are financial markets characterized by action at a distance; there is also a risk, as evident in the Madoff case, that face-to-face contacts, once they take place, may be used in a manipulative way to comfort investors and win their trust.
In methodological terms, we decided to employ a qualitative approach in this study, conducting interviews with individual investors in order to learn about the rationales behind their investment decisions. We believe that a qualitative approach is very appropriate for uncovering the dynamics of trust and accountability that are at the heart of our paper. Yet, we also acknowledge that this does not come without limitations. The rather small size of our sample does not allow for the same type of statistical generalization that a large sample could offer. While we do detect patterns in our data, the generalizations that we offer on the basis of these patterns must rely to an important extent on the persuasiveness of the theoretical arguments themselves.
When conducting our interviews, we were aware of the difficult experiences that many of our interviewees had gone through and were continuing to go through. We therefore decided to keep the conversations rather short and to focus our questions on investors' involvement in the Madoff case. Perhaps, a more comprehensive consideration of our interviewees' "life projects" (involving, for example, their experiences with investments in the past) could have shed some additional information on their decisions in the Madoff case. We can only encourage future research to explore this possibility and follow people's investment decisions over a longer period of time. Such longitudinal studies have provided rich insights in sociology and policy analysis (e.g., Halsey, Heath, and Ridge 1980) and they may prove also fruitful for our understanding of people's behavior on financial markets, especially regarding questions of trust and accountability. In this respect, there is also scope to examine in more depth potential differences between individual and institutional investors' behavior. While some researchers have looked at the roles of institutional investors (e.g., Collins, Gong, and Hribar 2003) and their interactions with company managers (e.g., Roberts et al. 2006) , we still know little about institutional investors' ability to detect mismanagement or fraud in financial markets.
Finally, an interview approach is retrospective in nature and therefore relies upon interviewees' recollections of their past actions and experiences. To complement such an approach, it may be worthwhile to explore the micro-dynamics of trust and accountability in a more real-time setting. Experimental studies, which constitute a well-established method in accounting research, may be a way forward in this respect.
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